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INTRODUCTION
What if you practiced a traditional Native American
religion? In the past, the federal government seized your sacred
sites and turned them into recreational destinations for tourists.
Visitors now litter and vandalize the sites, behave disrespectfully
while you try to pray or hold services, and even stand on your
equivalent of an altar.' But what if you practiced a New Age
religion that also reveres some of these Native American sacred
sites, albeit in a different manner? Out of respect for Native
American beliefs, you might be prohibited by a federal agency
from worshipping at a site that you hold sacred.2 How should
federal land managers balance the competing religious,
commercial, environmental, and recreational interests that seek to
use federal lands, while also complying with the United States
Constitution?
Motivated by concerns that their decisions were having a
negative impact on Native American religious practices, federal
land managers have addressed the acute problems that face
practitioners of Native American religions by providing them with
limited accommodations. 3 Some National Park and Forest Service
accommodations have prompted constitutional challenges under
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004.
1. See Chris Smith & Elizabeth Manning, The Sacred and Profane Collide
in the West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 26, 1997, available at
http://www.hcn.org (describing the impact of tourism on Native American
sacred sites and the destruction of sacred sites caused by the construction of
Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell).
2. See IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE: PROTECTING AMERICA'S SACRED
LANDS (PBS Point of View broadcast, August 14, 2001) (describing the conflict
between practitioners of traditional Native American religions and New Age
practitioners over a sacred site on Mt. Shasta).
3. See discussion infra Section 1.
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the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.4 However, the
Establishment Clause only provides half of the constitutional
picture.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects the religious liberty of every citizen with two mutually
supporting clauses. 5 The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
adherents or nonbelievers from government action that either
singles them out for discrimination or burdens their religious
6practices. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from favoring or promoting religion.7 Until recently, the test set
out in Lemon v. Kurtzman,8 known as the Lemon test, controlled
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.9 In Lynch v. Donnelly,10
Justice O'Connor suggested a modified interpretation of the Lemon
test, and her interpretation became known as the endorsement test.
This Note will show, through a case study of Native
American religious sites on federal lands,"1 that the endorsement
4. See id.
5. See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 11 (1995).
6. See id. at 13.
7. See id. at 14.
8. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
9. See discussion infra Section 11.
10. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. 1 will argue in Sections III. - V. that the endorsement test ensures that
National Park Service and National Forest Service accommodations of Native
American religions, which are required by statute and executive order, receive a
thorough and informed analysis by the courts before being found constitutional
or unconstitutional. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B) (2000)
(authorizing the inclusion in the National Historic Register of properties of
traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization); Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16
U.S.C. § 470ii(a) (2000) (requiring consideration of the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act before promulgating and carrying out rules and
regulations); Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3005
(2000) (providing for repatriation of human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations); American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 (2000) (requiring the government to protect the free exercise of Native
American religions by measures "including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites"); Exec. Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771
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test protects disfavored and minority religions from judicial
prejudice or misunderstanding better than exclusive use of the
Lemon test. Some commentators have suggested that the
endorsement test primarily favors majority religions.' 2 However,
the endorsement test provides two significant benefits to minority
religions. If the test is applied in the manner that Justice O'Connor
suggests, judicial opinions will be based on an informed
understanding of the religion and religious practices in question,
and the courts will thoroughly consider all effects of the
government action.' 3  The debate is not settled as to which
constitutional test is the best one to use when analyzing cases that
deal with the Establishment Clause.' 4 However, the endorsement
test proposed by Justice O'Connor protects accommodations to
disfavored or minority religions from being declared
unconstitutional for improper reasons, such as prejudice or
misunderstanding.
(May 24, 1996) ("[E]ach executive branch agency with statutory or
administrative responsibility for the management of Federal lands shall ... (1)
accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian
religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of
such sacred sites. Where appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality
of sacred sites.").
12. See Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1639, 1647-50 (1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Anjali
Sakaria, Worshipping Substantive Equality Over Formal Neutrality: Applying
the Endorsement Test to Sect-Specific Legislative Accommodations, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 483,492 (2002).
The fundamental problem with Justice O'Connor's
objective observer test is that her objective observer
still measures objectivity against the backdrop of a
Christian society. The objective observer is
functionally a reasonable Christian and therefore is less
likely to see the offensiveness of a government action
that supports Christianity. For many non-Christians or
atheists, the religious nature of a creche or prayer does
not easily fade into the background, regardless of how
long the practice has persisted.
Id.
13. See discussion infra Sections 11. - 111.
14. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495,495-98 (1986).
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The first section will introduce the issues surrounding the
practice of Native American religions on federal lands, and the
second section will discuss modem Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and the endorsement test. The third section will
examine how the factors included in the endorsement test apply to
Native American religions. The fourth section will demonstrate
that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test directs the courts to
examine history, context, and all secular purposes for the
accommodation. The fifth section will show that use of the
endorsement test by the courts gives federal agencies greater
discretion to accommodate minority religions in a constitutionally
permissible manner.
1. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIONS
The government of the United States has a history of
suppressing, discriminating against, and burdening the exercise of
Native American religions. 15 Between 1980 and 1988, Native
Americans tried unsuccessfully to overcome, through litigation,
burdens on the free exercise of their traditional religious practices
caused by the destruction of their sacred sites on federal lands.'
6
15. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN
INDIAN MANIFESTO (1969) [hereinafter CUSTER DIED] (analyzing the historical
roots of current problems facing Indians); Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains:
Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Towards Indians, 66
WASH. L. REv. 643 (1991) (comparing the historical and current treatment of
Indians by the United States and Canadian governments).
16. Cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause by Native Americans
have failed as a result of judicial prejudices and misunderstanding of Native
American religions. See, e.g., Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (holding that government action need not
serve a compelling government interest in order to significantly burden the free
exercise of a religion, as long as the government action does not coerce
individuals from or penalize individuals for practicing their religion); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
government's interest in supplying water from Lake Powell is compelling
enough to justify Lake Powell's infringement on the plaintiffs' religious practices
and that the government's management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument
does not infringe upon the plaintiffs' free exercise of Native American
religions); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the plaintiffs "have not alleged infringement of a constitutionally
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However, beginning in the 1990's, the National Park Service and
National Forest Service attempted to accommodate Native
American religious practices on federal lands.' 7 As a result, in the
late 1990's and the first years of this century, citizens who are not
Native American have raised several challenges in court to
National Park Service and National Forest Service
accommodations. The court challenges relied on the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the plaintiffs
argued that the government had established Native American
religions. 18 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue
of how the Establishment Clause applies to the accommodation of
religious practices on federal lands. 19 Therefore, this Note will
examine the Supreme Court's general Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, before turning to how the lower federal courts have
dealt with this issue.
cognizable First Amendment right," because they failed to demonstrate that the
Little Tennessee Valley was central to their religion); Laurie Ensworth, Native
American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands, in NATIVE
AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 153-179 (John R. Wunder
ed., 1996) (arguing that the courts improperly rejected Native American claims
in Badoni and Sequoyah).
17. See, e.g., ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED
PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL TRADITIONS 78-80, 103, 125-31, 135-44, 149-
57, 162-70 (2000) (describing several examples of National Park and Forest
Service accommodations).
18. See Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1224-26 (D. Utah 2002) (holding that the accommodations did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 1279, 1293-97 (D. Wyo. 2001) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the suit); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp.
2d 1448, 1453-57 (D. Wyo. 1998) (holding that the voluntary climbing ban did
not violate the Establishment Clause and the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge either the interpretative program or the signs asking visitors to stay on
the trail), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
19. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to the only circuit court case
addressing the issue. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp.
2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1037 (2000).
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II. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Although many of the Court's opinions concerning
Establishment Clause questions have been divided or appear
contradictory,20 a majority of the Court approved the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test,2 ' which has never been expressly overruled. 2 The
Lemon test requires that every analysis under the Establishment
Clause consider three criteria developed by the Court in its past
opinions: 23 "i[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ,,24
However, the Lemon test, if applied strictly, would nullify any
religious accommodations by the government, so the Supreme
Court has sometimes applied the test more flexibly in order to
comport with Free Exercise Clause requirements. 25 Over the
years, the Court has applied the Lemon test inconsistently, and
many unpredictable or incongruous opinions have resulted. 6 This
has caused widespread criticism of the Lemon test.
27
In response to problems created by inconsistent application
of the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor proposed a clarification of the
Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly.28 She suggested that government
action should be prohibited only if it constitutes an "endorsement"
of religion.29 At times, a majority of the Supreme Court has
20. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-15, 1288-93 (2d ed. 1988) (describing Marsh v. Chambers and Lynch v.
Donelly as problematic anomalies in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2476 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
24. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
25. See Shahin Rezai, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos
in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 503, 517, 520 (1990).
26. See id.
27. See Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the
Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1291, 1302 (1996).
28. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984).
29. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)
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expressed approval for the endorsement test and applied it in its
analysis of Establishment Clause issues,30 and some circuits have
modified the Lemon test to include Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test.31 Therefore, it is important to understand Justice O'Connor's
proposed application of the endorsement test to Establishment
Clause issues.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test is premised on a
different understanding of the Establishment Clause than the
Lemon test. Her test is based on the presumption that the
separation of church and state is impossible, because sometimes
the government's interests overlap or conflict with those of
particular religions. 32 In her understanding of the Establishment
Clause, a government action may constitutionally help or hinder a
particular religious group, as long as the government does not use
its power to express endorsement or disapproval of religion.3 3 She
30. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94, 602-
603 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-87 (1987); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373,389-90 (1985).
31. See ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563 (6th Cir.
1986); Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1222 (D.
Utah 2002). The court in Natural Arch wrote:
In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion sought "to refine the Lemon analysis to focus
more on whether the government is 'endorsing'
religion." ... Although Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Lynch appears to be the predominate test
when evaluating Establishment Clause claims, the
Tenth Circuit applies "both the purpose and the effect
components of the refined endorsement test, together
with the entanglement criterion imposed by Lemon...
Id. (citations omitted).
32. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
33. See id. Justice O'Connor describes her understanding of the
Establishment Clause:
A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest
often has an incidental or even a primary effect of
helping or hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would
ensue if every such statute were invalid under the
Establishment Clause... . The endorsement test does
20031 MNORITY REPORT
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therefore argues that religious accommodation, if it lifts a
government imposed burden on the free exercise of religion and
does not endorse religion, is constitutionally permissible under the
endorsement test.34  The endorsement test's flexibility to permit
religious accommodation, in certain circumstances, should remove
the need to continue applying the Lemon test inconsistently.
35
The addition of the endorsement test shifts the focus of the
Lemon test inquiry from the substantive effect of the government
action to the symbolic effect of the government action. 36 Justice
O'Connor defines endorsement as government action that "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. 3 7 In order to determine whether a government action
has the symbolic effect of endorsing religion to an objective
observer, the endorsement test places additional factors into two of
the Lemon test's prongs.
38
not preclude government from acknowledging religion
or from taking religion into account in making law and
policy. It does preclude government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such
an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the
nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure ... to conform... is plain."
Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. See id.
36. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Marshall, supra note 14, at 515-21.
37. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Justice O'Connor describes her additions to the Lemon prongs:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to
[Vol. I
Two factors-context and secular purpose-are included in
the endorsement test and reveal the unique circumstances of the
government action,39 enabling the courts to make more informed
rulings on the constitutionality of specific religious
accommodations. First, the endorsement test requires a contextual
inquiry under the Lemon effect prong, in order to determine
whether the action conveys an endorsement of religion to an
objective observer.40 Context includes 1) the historical context of
the community and forum and 2) the context of other government
actions in the community and forum.4 1 Second, the endorsement
either question should render the challenged practice
invalid.
Id at 690.
39. See id. at 694 ("Every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion.").
40. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
779-81 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 595 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76, 83 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. See Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 780-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76, 83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court
articulates the necessity of examining the context of the government action
under the endorsement test:
Although Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion
in Lynch, she wrote a concurrence that differs in
significant respects from the majority opinion. The
main difference is that the concurrence provides a
sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols... . [T]he
concurrence articulates a method for determining
whether the government's use of an object with
religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion.
The effect of the display depends upon the message
that the government's practice communicates: the
question is "what viewers may fairly understand to be
the purpose of the display." That inquiry, of necessity,
turns upon the context in which the contested object
appears: "[A] typical museum setting, though not
neutralizing the religious content of a religious
painting, negates any message of endorsement of that
content." The concurrence thus emphasizes that the
20031 MNORITY REPORT
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test requires an inquiry under the Lemon purpose prong into all
secular purposes served by the government action, in order to
determine whether the government's actual purpose was to endorse
42religion. In cases that concern Native American religions,
analysis under the "purpose" prong invites examination of the
general history and culture of Native American tribes.43 Because
the endorsement test factors inform the courts of circumstances
that would not otherwise be examined with exclusive use of the
Lemon test, the endorsement test increases the thoroughness with
which the courts analyze accommodations of minority religions, as
will be shown in the next section.
III. THE ENDORSEMENT TEST AND NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIONS
The judiciary and the federal government have shown
disfavor to Native American religions, denying these minority
religions the protections promised by the First Amendment.4
Although Native American citizens have made great strides in
advancing their civil rights,45 many judges and jurors have either
retained subtle prejudices against Native American religions or
lack understanding of these traditions.46 Accommodations of
minority religions are also more likely to be found invalid under
constitutionality of the creche in that case depended
upon its "particular physical setting," and further
observes: "Every government practice must be judged
in its unique circumstances to determine whether it
[endorses] religion[.]"
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (citations omitted).
42. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816-18
(10th Cir. 1999) (describing the history and culture of Native American tribes).
44. See discussion infra Subsections A. - B.
45. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF
RELIGION 4-24 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter GOD is RED].
46. See Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1734-35; Smith &
Manning, supra note 1. "As Steven Moore of the Colorado-based Native
American Rights Fund points out, not once have the courts saved a sacred place
based exclusively on Native American arguments that their right to freely
practice their religion was compromised or destroyed." Id.
[Vol. I
the Lemon test than accommodations of majority religions simply
because they don't have the weight of tradition behind them.47
The two factors required by the endorsement test limit the
potential that courts will decide the constitutionality of
accommodations of Native American religions based on
misunderstanding or arbitrary prejudices. Instead, these factors
direct the court to consider the government action in its unique
circumstances.48  If seen in light of history and context,
accommodations of disfavored or minority religions are inherently
less likely to serve as endorsement of these religions, because an
objective observer would view the accommodations as necessary
to assure the free exercise of these religions.49 The application of
47. Cf Marshall, supra note 14, at 507-509; W. Scott Simpson, Lemon
Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for
Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 466-70 (1986);
William Van Alystyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L. J. 770, 785-87 (1984).
48. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.
In making that determination, courts must keep in mind
both the fundamental place held by the Establishment
Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad,
subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can
be eroded.
Id.
49. See Sakaria, supra note 12, at 488-89, 502.
When a legislature accommodates a majority religious
group, individuals are more likely to perceive the
accommodation as an insidious attempt by the majority
to advance a religious agenda, leading to feelings of
political exclusion on the part of those not
accommodated. Because majority religious groups are
often implicitly accommodated through majoritarian
laws, accommodations of majority religious groups are
more likely to be perceived as expressions of religious
favoritism, rather than legitimate attempts to lift a
burden on religious exercise. With respect to legislative
accommodations of a minority religious group, on the
other hand, individuals are likely to perceive the
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Justice O'Connor's endorsement test ensures that accommodations
of disfavored or minority religions are not deemed unconstitutional
without a thorough and informed analysis by the courts.
A. The Context of Accommodations to Native American
Religions
Under the effect prong of the Lemon test, Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test requires an inquiry into the context of
the accommodations.50  Although the context factor of the
endorsement test has attracted criticism as applied by the Supreme
Court to majority religions,5 ' contextual analysis has the potential
to benefit minority religions, because it increases the court's
overall knowledge of the circumstances. Context includes the
historical context of the community and forum and the context of
accommodations positively and to impute noble
intentions of religious tolerance and pluralism to the
accommodating legislature .... Upholding a
legislative accommodation of a minority religious
group, while striking down an identical
accommodation for a majority religious group, is not
inherently invidious. Given that laws are enacted
through a democratic process that advantages majority
religions, treating majority and minority religions
unequally might be the only way to achieve equal
religious liberty in society. Strict adherence to formal
denominational neutrality, while superficially
providing equal treatment to religious groups,
implicitly disfavors the religious liberty of members of
minority religions since these individuals are most
likely to experience conflict between religious exercise
and majoritarian laws.
Id.
50. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
779-81 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 595 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., Rezai, supra note 25, at 532-36 (criticizing the Court's
analysis of context in Allegheny).
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other government actions in the community and forum.52 In cases
concerning Native American religions on federal lands, the
community is the entire United States and the forum includes all
federal lands. The following portion of this Note will make the
contextual inquiry by 1) examining the historical treatment of
Native American religions by the federal government and the
agencies that control federal lands and 2) discussing the practices
of other religious groups that are permitted, or sponsored by the
government, on federal lands.
First, the federal government has historically discriminated
against, suppressed, and controlled or limited the practice of
Native American religions. 53 One important limitation was the
federal government's seizure of Native American sacred sites.
Prior to the conquest of the Americas by Europeans, Native
Americans possessed the entire continent, including what are now
considered federal lands and the National Parks and Forests.
54
Vine Deloria, Jr., a practicing lawyer and professor of Native
American studies, describes the centrality of location-specific
sacred sites in Native American religious traditions:
[T]here are ... some places of inherent
sacredness, sites that are holy in and of
themselves ....
Among the duties which must be performed at
these Holy Places are ceremonies which the
people have been commanded to perform in
order that the earth itself and all its forms of
life might survive ... . The cumulative effect
of continuous secularity [and impiety at
52. See Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 780-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. See generally CUSTER DIED, supra note 15 (analyzing the historical
roots of current problems facing Indians); Johnson, supra note 15 (comparing
the historical and current treatment of Indians by the United States and Canadian
governments).
54. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542-44 (1832) (describing
land ownership in the Americas before European conquest).
20031
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sacred sites will] ... bring about the massive
destruction of the planet.
However, Native Americans lost all property interest in many of
their sacred sites as a direct result of government policies. 56 Loss
of title to sacred sites has limited the exercise of many religious
practices, because Native Americans are unable to fully use or
possess their sacred sites and can no longer exclude others from
them.5 7  Therefore, the federal government has significantly
burdened the free exercise of Native American religions on federal
lands, as a result of historical conquest and government policies
concerning Native American land ownership.
Not only have Native Americans lost exclusive possession
of their sacred sites, the federal government and federal agencies
have also actively discriminated against the practice of Native
American religions on federal lands.58  Past federal policy
55. VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN
AMERICA 209-10 (James Treat ed., 1999) [hereinafter FOR THIS LAND].
56. See U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980)
(holding that the 1877 Act took the Black Hills, including Devil's Tower, from
the Sioux without just compensation.); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
566 (1903); CUSTER DIED, supra note 15, at 28-53.
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an
Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be
exercised only when circumstances arise which ...
demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians
themselves, that it should do so. When, therefore,
treaties were entered into between the United States
and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a
contingency such power might be availed of from
considerations of governmental policy, particularly if
consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566.
57. See Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 463-64 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Recognizing that the high
country is 'indispensable' to the religious lives of the approximately 5,000 Tribe
members who reside in the area, the court concluded 'that the proposed
government operations would virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability to
practice their religion.' ") (citations omitted); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1308, at 1262-
65 (1978).
58. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18
(10th Cir. 1999); GOD IS RED, supra note 45, at 239-41, 246-47.
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suppressed the practice of Native American religions through
federal support of Christian missionaries on tribal reservations,
laws prohibiting Native American religions, and even violence.
59
More recent federal statutes, which were not enacted with the
intent of affecting Native American religious practices, have been
interpreted by federal agencies in ways that discriminate against
the practice of Native American religions on federal lands.
60
Viewed in the historical context of federal control over Native
American sacred sites and discrimination against Native American
religions, current federal agency policies that protect the practice
of Native American religions are best seen as accommodations that
lift government imposed burdens on religion, rather than an
endorsement of these religions.
6 1
Second, viewed in the context of all religious practices
permitted in the National Parks, agency policies that protect of
59. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817-18 (describing past federal policies
designed to suppress the practice of Native American religions).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at 1262-65 (1978).
[T]here were many instances where the religious rights
of the traditional Native Americans were being
infringed upon by Federal statutes, regulations, or
enforcement policies. New barriers have been raised
against the pursuit of their traditional culture, of which
the religion is an integral part.... Lack of knowledge,
unawareness, insensitivity, and neglect are the
keynotes of the Federal government's interaction with
traditional Indian's religions and cultures. This state of
affairs is enhanced by the perception of many non-
Indian officials that because Indian religious practices
are different than their own that they somehow do not
have the same status as a "real" religion. Yet, the effect
on the individual whose religious customs are violated
or infringed upon is as onerous as if [she or he] had
been Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish.
Id.
61. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (holding that government efforts
to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove government-
imposed burdens on the free exercise of religion); TRIBE, supra note 20, § 14-4,
14-7 (describing religious accommodation as an intersection of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and defining constitutional
accommodation).
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Native American religions are even more clearly revealed to be
remedial accommodations, rather than active endorsements. In
fact, Native American religions are disfavored compared to the
extensive favor the federal government has shown to the practice
of Christianity. 62  Native Americans have struggled for the
opportunity to freely exercise their religion on federal lands,63 but
Christianity has a secure foothold in the National Parks as a result
of the favor shown to it by the federal government.64 For example,
the Park Service manages many parks that have Christian church
buildings with active parishes or congregations. 65 Catholic masses
62. See Charles Levendosky, Respecting Sacred Sites: Why Not
Accommodate Indians at Devil's Tower as We Accommodate Christians
Elsewhere?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 18, 1997, at IB, available at 1997
WL 6836569.
63. See, e.g., Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 45-451 (1988) (holding that government action need not serve a
compelling government interest in order to significantly burden the free exercise
of a religion, as long as the government action does not coerce individuals from
or penalize individuals for practicing their religion); Badoni v. Higginson, 638
F.2d 172, 177-178 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the government's interest in
supplying water from Lake Powell is compelling enough to justify Lake
Powell's infringement on the plaintiffs' religious practices and that the
government's management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument does not
infringe upon the plaintiffs' free exercise of Native American religions);
Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the plaintiffs "have not alleged infringement of a constitutionally cognizable
First Amendment right," because they failed to demonstrate that the Little
Tennessee Valley was central to their religion); Ensworth, supra note 16, at
153-179 (arguing that the courts improperly rejected Native American claims in
Badoni and Sequoyah).
64. See Levendosky, supra note 62.
65. The National Park Service owns and operates Boston National
Historical Park, which includes Old North Church, 16 U.S.C. § 410z (a) (2000),
San Antonio Missions National Historical Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410ee(a)-(b) (2000)
(authorizing cooperative management agreements with the Catholic
Archdiocese), Mission San Jose in Tumacdicori National Historical Park, 16
U.S.C. § 410ss - 410ss-1 (2000), the Shrine of the Ages Chapel in Grand
Canyon National Park,
http://www.nps.gov/grca/grandcanyon/trip_planner/generalinformation.htm
(last modified 12/2/02) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review), the
Yellowstone National Park Chapel,
http://www.nps.gov/yell/tours/ftyell/frtstop5.htm (last modified 7/2/99) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review), Yosemite National Park Chapel, Ron
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are still offered in the San Antonio Missions,66 and the National
Park Service even sponsors the re-enactment of a historic Catholic
mass at Tumacicori National Historical Park twice each year.67
The National Park Service also permits a Christian non-profit
organization, which engages in proselytization, to minister in
thirty-five National Parks. In the Black Hills National Forest,
where Lakota Indians were denied the right to set up a spiritual
retreat, there are a number of Christian churches as well as the
Placerville Camp of the United Church of Christ.
69
Christianity's secure foothold in the National Parks
provides a foil for the treatment of Native American religions by
federal agencies. 70 Unlike agency protection of Native American
religions, which historical context has shown to be accommodation
of these religions, federal agency support for Christianity cannot be
viewed as mere accommodation of Christianity. The tenets of
Christianity do not require worship services to be held at any
particular location, and there is no need to hold services on federal
lands.7 1 Therefore, allowing the practice of Christianity on federal
lands is not an accommodation, because permitting Christian
services to be held in the National Parks does not remove any
Orozco, Yosemite Community Church, THE FRESNO BEE, June 9, 2001, available
at http://www.fresnobee.com/local/religion/church_profiles/story/654759p-
700087c.html (on file with the First Amendment Law Review), and countless
other churches.
66. See http://www.nps.gov/saan/visit/MissionSanJose.htm (last modified
2/10/02) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
67. See Smith & Manning, supra note 1.
68. See http://www.coolworks.comlacmnp/parks.htm (last visited 1/9/03)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review) for a list of the parks that have
Christian ministry and worship services sponsored by A Christian Ministry in
the National Parks.
69. See U.S. v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 264 (W.D. S.D. 1985), rev'd,
858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988).
70. Accommodations of Native American religions in the National Parks
and Forests have raised public outcry and challenges in court, while the practice
of Christianity in the National Parks and Forests has raised little legal
controversy. See Smith & Manning, supra note I (reporting on the public
outcry in response to the accommodations). There have been no major court
challenges to the practice of Christianity in the National Parks and Forests.
71. See Means, 627 F.Supp. at 264.
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barrier to the free exercise of Christianity. 72 In contrast, Native
American religious beliefs require that worship services be held at
traditional sacred sites, many of which are now on federal lands.
73
In the context of all government action in the National
Parks and Forests, the federal government appears to endorse the
practice of Christianity rather than the practice of Native American
religions.74 Christianity is the majority religion of this nation, and
the federal government has actively endorsed Christianity,7 for
72. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987) (holding that
government efforts to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove
government-imposed burdens on the free exercise of religion); TRIBE, supra
note 20, § 14-4, 14-7 (describing religious accommodation as an intersection of
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and defining constitutional
accommodation).
73. See Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 460-62 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions,
Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use
of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious
practice derives from the Native American perception
that land is itself a sacred, living being. Rituals are
performed in prescribed locations not merely as a
matter of traditional orthodoxy, but because land, like
all other living things, is unique, and specific sites
possess different spiritual properties and
significance... . [T]he qualities "of silence, the
aesthetic perspective, and the physical attributes, are an
extension of the sacredness of [each] particular site."
Id. (citations omitted).
74. See Levendosky, supra note 62.
75. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604-605 (1989)
("The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous
examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity specifically. Some of these
examples date back to the Founding of the Republic, but this heritage of official
discrimination against non-Christians has no place in the jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause.") (citations omitted); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-
106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the historical preference of
the government for Christianity as the state religion means that the
Establishment Clause only forbids the establishment of an official national
religion and preference among religious sects); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 792 (1983) (holding that Christian legislative prayer does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
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example, when it forced Native Americans to convert to
Christianity. 76 Christianity, as a religious tradition, also seeks to
convert new members.77 On the other hand, adherents to Native
American religions have always been in the minority and have
often been subjected to unfavorable government policies. 8 Most
adherents of Native American religions do not proselytize, and
most sects limit their membership to those born into a particular
tribe or with Native American ancestry.79
Accommodations of Native American religions, viewed in
historical context and considered in the context of all religious
practices permitted on federal lands, will not convey endorsement
of these religions. Therefore, according to Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, such accommodations do not violate the
Establishment Clause.
B. The Secular Purposes for Accommodation of Native
American Religions
Under the purpose prong of the Lemon test, Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test also requires an inquiry into all
secular purposes served by the accommodations in order to
determine whether the government's actual purpose was to endorse
religion. In cases concerning Native American religions, an
examination of the general history and culture of Native American
tribes is necessary to determine the secular purposes served by the
76. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18
(10th Cir. 1999).
77. See FOR THIS LAND, supra note 55, at 262.
78. See BearLodge, 175 F.3d at 817-18.
79. See FOR THIS LAND, supra note 55, at 262.
Unlike Western religions which sought to convert a
selected number of true believers and convince them a
particular interpretation of planetary history was
correct, tribal religions were believed to be special
communications between spirits and a specific group of
people... No demand existed, however, for the people
to go into the world and inform or instruct other people
in the rituals or beliefs of the tribe.
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accommodation of these religions.80  The history of Native
American religions detailed in the previous subsection reveals the
fact that the federal government has imposed substantial burdens
on the free exercise of these religions.8' This adverse history and
the adverse history of Native American tribes in general has
created three secular purposes for the accommodation of Native
American religions on federal lands: religious accommodation, the
fulfillment of trust responsibilities owed by the federal government
to Native tribes, and cultural preservation.
82
The first secular purpose served by accommodation of
Native American religions on federal lands is constitutionally
permissible religious accommodation. 83 The federal government
created significant barriers to the free exercise of Native American
religions when it assumed ownership of Native American sacred
sites, attempted to suppress all exercise of these religions, and
prevented the exercise of these religions on what are now federal
lands.84  The Supreme Court has held that removal of a
government-imposed burden on the free exercise of a religion is a
valid secular purpose,
8 5
80. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. See discussion supra Subsection A.
82. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448,
1454-55 (D. Wyo. 1998) (finding the secular purposes served by the
accommodation of Native American religions in the National Parks and National
Forests), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
83. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson, supra note 15, at 646-
662, 685-86.
85. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987) (holding that
government efforts to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove
government-imposed burdens on the free exercise of religion); Bear Lodge, 2 F.
Supp. 2d at 1454-55. The court in Bear Lodge held that accommodation is a
legitimate secular purpose:
In this case the Defendants contend that the climbing
plan was designed, in part, to eliminate barriers to
American Indian's free practice of religion. They argue
that this type of accommodation is particularly
appropriate in situations like this where impediments to
worship arise because a group's sacred place of
worship is found on property of the United States....
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The second secular purpose served by accommodation of
Native American religions on federal lands is the fulfillment of the
trust responsibilities the United States government owes to Native
American tribes to return to the tribes the use of their sacred
sites.86  Most federal lands, including those on which Native
American sacred sites are located, were taken from Native
Americans by war, treaty, allotment policies, or in the exercise of
authority as the trustee of tribal lands.87 Tribes lost control over
their sacred sites as a result of federal policies, even though they
never intended to give up their right to practice their religion at
their sacred sites. 88 The federal government has acknowledged its
responsibility to Native Americans to restore their religious
freedoms with the passage of the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978 and other statutes and the signing of an
Executive Order in 1996.89 Therefore, the accommodation of
The purposes underlying the ban are really to remove
barriers to religious worship occasioned by public
ownership of the Tower. This is in the nature of
accommodation, not promotion, and consequently is a
legitimate secular purpose.
Id.
86. See Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State,
470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (holding that the Indian right of occupancy can only
be extinguished by plain and unambiguous government action, because "[tlhe
canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust
relationship between the United States and the Indians."); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565, 567 (1903) (describing the trust relationship
between the United States government and Native American tribes); Natural
Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 (D. Utah 2002)
(finding that the trust relationship between the United States government and
Native Americans provided a valid secular purpose for consultation with tribes
concerning the management of federal lands).
87. See CUSTER DIED, supra note 15, at 28-53; Johnson, supra note 15, at
646-662, 685-86.
88. See Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community, 34 IND. L. REV.
1291, 1306 (2001) ("Native peoples ... hold different notions about the
appropriate relationship and obligations people hold with respect to the land.
The mere fact that the land is not held in Native title does not mean that the
people do not hold these obligations, nor ... that they no longer maintain the
rights to these lands.").
89. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B) (2000) (authorizing the
inclusion in the National Historic Register of properties of traditional religious
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Native American religions on federal lands also serves the purely
secular purpose of restoring to the tribes, through federal agency
policies and management plans, some of the property rights lost
when the United States government failed to adequately protect
their interests.
The third secular purpose served by accommodation of
Native American religions on federal lands is the preservation of
Native American culture. Cultural preservation, under the
National Historic Preservation Act,90 has been considered a valid
secular purpose by at least one court.91  Traditional Native
Americans insist that their religion and culture are inextricably
intertwined.92 Deloria describes traditional Native American
beliefs,
Religion is not conceived as a personal
relationship between the deity and each
individual. It is rather a covenant between a
particular god and a particular community ...
. Religion dominates the tribal culture, and
distinctions existing in Western civilization
and cultural importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization);
Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a) (2000)
(requiring consideration of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act before
promulgating and carrying out rules and regulations); Native American Graves
and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (providing for repatriation of
human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000) (requiring the
government to protect the free exercise of Native American religions by
measures "including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites"); Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996) ("[E]ach
executive branch agency with statutory or administrative responsibility for the
management of Federal lands shall ... (1) accommodate access to and
ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2)
avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites. Where
appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality of sacred sites.").
90. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470-470x-6
(2000).
91. See Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1224 (D. Utah 2002); H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at 1262-65 (1978).
92. See GOD IS RED, supra note 45, at 194.
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no longer present themselves. Political
activity and religious activity are barely
distinguishable. History is not divided into
categories. It is simultaneously religious,
political, economic, social, and intellectual.93
Preservation of a traditional American culture, such as Native
American culture, is a proper secular goal for the National Park
Service and Forest Service under the National Historic
Preservation Act.
94
The presence of three such significant secular purposes for
the accommodation of Native American religions indicates that the
government's purpose was not to convey endorsement of these
religions. Therefore, according to Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test, such accommodations do not violate the Establishment
Clause.
When determining whether accommodations to Native
American religions violate the Establishment Clause, the courts
should consider the context of these accommodations. They
should also examine the three secular purposes of religious
accommodation, fulfillment of trust responsibilities, and cultural
preservation. Without these considerations, a court's analysis
cannot be truly informed and thorough. Because the Lemon test
alone does not direct the courts to consider context and all the
secular purposes served by the government action, Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test provides necessary guidance for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence when it concerns the
accommodation of Native American or other minority religions.
IV. LEMON-AID: THE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATING THE
ENDORSEMENT TEST
Three cases, Badoni v. Higginson,95 Natural Arch and
Bridge Society v. Alston,96 and Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v.
93. Id.
94. See discussion of Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark injfa
Section V.
95. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
96. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002).
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Babbitt,97 demonstrate how the endorsement test prevents
incomplete and conclusory analysis, which results from the
application of the Lemon test alone. Badoni was decided before
Justice O'Connor proposed the endorsement test, while Natural
Arch and Bear Lodge were decided after the Tenth Circuit adopted
the endorsement test.98 Both Badoni and Natural Arch concern the
same sacred site, Rainbow Bridge National Monument, and similar
requests for accommodation by Native American tribes.
99
However, the Tenth Circuit in Badoni held that proposed
accommodations of Native American religions at Rainbow Bridge
National Monument would violate the Establishment Clause,
while a Tenth Circuit district court, held in Natural Arch that
similar accommodations of Native American religions did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 10
A. Badoni
Before Justice O'Connor proposed the endorsement test,
0 2
the court in Badoni applied the Lemon test exclusively. The rigid
language of the Lemon test resulted in an incomplete analysis by
the court of the Establishment Clause issues raised by the proposed
accommodations. 0 3  The court's literal reading of the purpose
prong of the Lemon test invalidated any form of religious
accommodation,' °4 even though religious accommodation is
sometimes required under the Free Exercise Clause.'
0 5
97. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir.
1999).
98. Badoni was decided in 1980; Lynch was decided in 1984; Bear Lodge
was decided in 1999; NaturalArch was decided in 2002.
99. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175; NaturalArch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
100. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179-80.
101. See NaturalArch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
102. See supra note 98.
103. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179-80.
104. But see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480
U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) ("This Court has long recognized that the government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do
so without violating the Establishment Clause."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 220-21 (1972) ("The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception
from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of
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The court's cursory analysis, which resulted from its use of
the Lemon test, is apparent in this passage from Badoni:
The test may be stated as follows: what are
the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to
say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.1
0 6
Bound by this literal reading, the court was unable to examine in
its analysis the history of Native American religions in the United
States or the context of Native American religions on federal
lands.'0 7 The eourt held that the appellants' request for privacy to
conduct occasional religious ceremonies at Rainbow Bridge and
that tourists visiting the Bridge act "in a respectful and appreciative
manner"'108 would turn the Bridge into "a government-managed
religious shrine"'1 9 in violation of the Establishment Clause." 0 If
the endorsement test had not been adopted, and the Lemon test
remained the sole standard of constitutionality, courts in the Tenth
Circuit would continue to use such conclusory reasoning to
the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any
exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by
the right of free exercise."); TRIBE, supra note 20, at § 14-4, 14-7 (describing
religious accommodation as an intersection of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses and defining constitutional accommodation).
105. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21.
106. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179 (footnote and citations omitted); Cf Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing
on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion makes clear
that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require
invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.").
107. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179-80.
108. Id. at 179.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 179-80.
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determine whether an accommodation of Native American
religions on federal lands violates the Establishment Clause."1
B. Natural Arch
Twenty-two years after Badoni, a Tenth Circuit district
court examined the very same issue in Natural Arch. 1 2 However,
the court used the endorsement test, in addition to the Lemon test,
and reached an entirely different result. 13 After Badoni was
decided, Rainbow Bridge in the late 1980's suffered ecological
damage, vandalism, overcrowding and excessive noise, and
destruction of archeological sites and petroglyphs, as a result of the
large crowds from Glen Canyon Recreational Area who could now
easily access the Monument. 1 4 In the words of the district court,
"[u]nlimited visitor access desecrated the sanctity of the bridge to
surrounding Native American tribes and lessened its overall
cultural importance."" 1 5 This desecration was a direct result of the
Badoni holding that any limitations on visitor access with the
purpose of accommodating Native American religions would be
unconstitutional.
The Park Service responded to the problem with the
preparation of a General Management Plan, which was completed
in 1993 after consultation with tribal religious leaders." 6 The Plan
accommodated Native American religious practices and beliefs by
educating the public about the spiritual significance of the site to
Native American religions and requesting that visitors not walk
111. Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) ("Rather than
mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer
benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith ... the
Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.").
112. Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.
Utah 2002).
113. See id. at 1222-26.
114. See id. at 1213.
115. Id.
116. See idat 1213-14.
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under the bridge out of respect for the beliefs of those religions.
117
These accommodations are very similar to some of the
accommodations proposed by the earlier plaintiffs in Badoni. In
response, Natural Arch and Bridge Society, a non-profit agency,
sued to have the Plan declared unconstitutional.
The district court held that the religious accommodations,
which included consultation with the tribes prior to making any
management decisions, visitor education, and requests for
respectful behavior, did not violate the Establishment Clause under
the Lemon test or the endorsement test." 1 8 The accommodations
had many valid secular purposes, 119 did not primarily advance
religion, 0 and did not excessively entangle the Park Service in
religion.'
2'
Under its Endorsement test inquiry, the court found that:
[A] reasonable observer aware of the history
and context of the community, would not
view the 1993 GMP and Interpretive
Prospectus as communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval....
Visitors are made aware of the beliefs of
others, but are not told that those beliefs are to
be preferred over any others, or that the Park
Service has adopted traditional religion as its
117. See Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1214 (D. Utah 2002).
118. See id. at 1224-26.
119. See id. at 1223-24. The court held:
[P]romoting an understanding of neighboring cultures
is an appropriate secular purpose which allows the
general public the opportunity to enhance their
individual and collective perspective. The purpose is
primarily informational. In addition, the policy serves a
dual secular purpose of fostering the preservation of
the historical, social, and cultural practices of Native
Americans.
id. at 1224.
120. The effect of the accommodations was not to "establish, promote, or
advance religion ... [but] to educate and inform the public about different
cultures and increase sensitivity to the beliefs of others." Id. at 1222-24.
121. See id. at 1225-26.
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own.... The policy ... does not ... coerce
visitors into practicing the Native American
religion associated with the belief about not
walking under the Rainbow God. In fact,
visitors to Rainbow Bridge have virtually no
opportunity to observe, let alone participate
in, the practice of traditional Native American
religions.
22
The court also found that the government's trust responsibilities
towards Native American tribes and the various federal statutes
enacted to protect tribal governments, cultures, and religions
provided additional secular purposes for the consultation.'
23
Despite the fact that the Tenth Circuit in Badoni held that very
similar accommodations were an unconstitutional "advancement"
of Native American religions, 24 the court in Natural Arch held
that the accommodations were constitutional under the
endorsement test.
Such opposing results under such similar circumstances
reveal the significance of incorporating the endorsement test into
the Lemon test. The three endorsement test factors prompted the
court in Natural Arch to inquire into the "history and context of the
community"'125 and examine all possible secular purposes served
by the accommodations. The court in Badoni was limited by the
language and form of the Lemon test: after holding that the
government action advanced religion in violation of one prong of
Lemon, the court was required to hold that the action violated the
Establishment Clause, regardless of how many important secular
purposes the action served. 26 In contrast, the endorsement test
permits the government to advance religion as long as it does not
endorse religion and shifts the focus of the constitutional inquiry to
the circumstances surrounding the accommodation.
122. Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1224-25 (D. Utah 2002).
123. See id. at 1226.
124. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179-80 (10th Cir. 1980).
125. NaturalArch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
126. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179-80.
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C. Bear Lodge
Bear Lodge, 127 the third case addressing this issue, provides
another demonstration that the endorsement test requires the courts
to consider accommodations in their unique circumstances before
making any ruling regarding their constitutionality. In Bear
Lodge, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the National Park Service Final Climbing Management Plan did
not violate the Establishment Clause.' 28 The Plan required Park
Service employees to request that rock climbers voluntarily refrain
from climbing Devil's Tower during June out of respect for Native
American religious practices such as the Sun Dance.' 29 The Tenth
Circuit held that the rock climbers lacked standing to sue, because
they alleged no injury in fact resulting from the Final Climbing
Management Plan.'
30
In Bear Lodge, the Tenth Circuit and the district court
engaged in a more thorough inquiry and a more informed analysis
of the facts than in Badoni. The district court specifically
acknowledged that religious accommodation serves a valid secular
purpose.' 3 ' It held that the Plan was a religious accommodation,
not coercive, did not advance religion, and did not excessively
entangle the government in religion.
132
Although it did not reach the merits of the claim, the Tenth
Circuit recognized the importance of Devil's Tower to Native
American culture and religion by beginning its opinion with a
lengthy discussion of Native American religions and the
significance of Devil's Tower to various Native tribes. 133  The
Tenth Circuit also noted the federal statutes that accommodate
Native American religions, by extending special protection to them
127. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D.
Wyo. 1998), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
128. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 822 (10th
Cir. 1999).
129. See id at 820.
130. Id. at 822.
131. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448,
1454-55 (D. Wyo. 1998).
132. See id. at 1554-56.
133. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 815-18.
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or allowing access to and/or authorizing temporary closure of
specific sacred sites located on federal lands.134 When examined
in concert, these three cases, Badoni, Natural Arch, and Bear
Lodge, demonstrate that the adoption of endorsement test has
improved the quality of the constitutional analysis of
Establishment Clause questions in the Tenth Circuit.
V. A "GOVERNMENT MANAGED SHRINE": MEDICINE WHEEL
NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK AS SACRED SITE AND
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,'35
a case concerned with the protection of Medicine Wheel National
Historic Landmark, is currently before the Tenth Circuit. This new
case is important because it demonstrates another potential benefit
of the endorsement test: use of the endorsement test by the courts
gives federal agencies greater discretion to accommodate minority
religions in a constitutionally permissible manner.
Federal agencies, which are required by statute and
executive order to accommodate the free exercise of Native
American religions,' 36 are more likely to do so in ways that satisfy
134. See id. at 818.
135. Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d
1279 (D. Wyo. 2001).
136. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d) (6) (A)-(B) (2000) (authorizing the
inclusion in the National Historic Register of properties of traditional religious
and cultural importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization);
Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a) (2000)
(requiring consideration of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act before
promulgating and carrying out rules and regulations); Native American Graves
and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (providing for repatriation of
human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony to Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000) (requiring the
government to protect the free exercise of Native American religions by
measures "including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites"); Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996) ("[E]ach
executive branch agency with statutory or administrative responsibility for the
management of Federal lands shall ... (1) accommodate access to and
ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2)
FIRST AMAENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. I
practitioners of these religions if they believe the accommodations
will survive Establishment Clause challenges. 137  Judicial
application of the endorsement test is more likely to result in an
accommodation of Native American religions being deemed
constitutional than judicial use of the Lemon test alone.' 38
Therefore, with strong evidence of a secular purpose or
purposes, federal agencies should theoretically be able to provide
broader accommodations, because any potential message of
endorsement would be diminished by the secular purpose. 13' The
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 140 provides such a
strong secular purpose, namely that of cultural preservation. This
Note will show how National Forest Service accommodations of
Native American religions at Medicine Wheel National Historic
Landmark under the NHPA are more encompassing than the
accommodations in Natural Arch and Bear Lodge as a result of the
overlap between NHPA requirements and the endorsement test
factors.
141
avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites. Where
appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality of sacred sites.").
137. After a preliminary injunction by the district court enjoining the
National Park Service from banning commercial rock climbing at Devil's Tower,
the Park Service withdrew all plans for mandatory bans on rock climbing at
Devil's Tower. The Forest Service also reversed its mandatory ban on rock
climbing at Cave Rock. However, the Park Service and Forest Service have
continued to pursue visitor education and voluntary bans, like the one upheld in
Bear Lodge. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820-21; Emily Miller, Climbing Ban
Fails, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 23, 1997, available at http://www.hcn.org.
138. See discussion supra Section IV.
139. Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that even marginal secular purposes, such as
"solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society" or the
"celebration of a public holiday with traditional symbols," may negate any
message of government endorsement of religion).
140. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 - 470x-6
(2000).
141. The accommodations in Natural Arch and Bear Lodge addressed
visitor education and voluntary requests for visitors to be respectful of Native
American beliefs. See discussion supra at pp. 140-141. At Medicine Wheel,
one goal of the Historic Preservation Plan is to decrease the number of visitors
and increase the privacy of Native American practitioners. See Historic
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Unlike Rainbow Bridge National Landmark or Devil's
Tower National Monument, Medicine Wheel is managed primarily
for the purpose of cultural preservation. Under the NHPA,
Medicine Wheel was declared a National Historic Landmark in
April 1969, and the latest Historic Preservation Plan for the site
was approved in 1996.142 Medicine Wheel is recognized as "a
sacred site and a nationally important traditional cultural
property."' 143 Cultural preservation under the NHPA has important
implications under the endorsement test. The fact that a federal
statute, which does not concern religion, also supports the
necessity of religious accommodation lessens any appearance of
government endorsement of Native American religions.
The status of "traditional cultural property" for tribal sacred
sites under the NHPA 44 provides credibility for the argument that
cultural preservation, rather than religious endorsement, is the
purpose and effect of accommodation. Detailed studies of a living
community's historical connection to the site, and the importance
of the site to the community's culture, are required before a site can
be designated a National Historic Landmark on this basis.' 45 This
requirement forces the National Park Service and National Forest
Service to establish the significance of a site to Native American
tribal cultures prior to giving a sacred site additional protection
under the Act.146  The detailed studies give the National Park
Service and National Forest Service substantial evidence of the
cultural and educational purposes served by the protection of a
Preservation Plan for Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark and Vicinity,
USDA Forest Service, Bighorn National Forest, 1969 S. Sheridan Ave.,
Sheridan, Wyoming 82801, pp. 31-34, 41-42 (September 1996) [hereinafter
HPPJ.
142. See Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1286-87 (D. Wyo. 2001).
143. See HPP, supra note 141, at 5.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B) (2000).
145. See Patricia L. Parker & Thomas E. King, Guidelines for Evaluating
and Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties, NATIONAL REGISTER
BULLETIN 38 (National Park Service); HPP, supra note 141, at 6-11.
146. Once a property is designated a National Historic Landmark, it ihas
substantially more protection than properties merely listed on the National
Register or not recognized at all. See Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic
Preservation, 21 VT. L. REv. 145, 167-70 (1996).
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sacred site and accommodations at the site, 147 and this evidence in
turn negates the appearance of government endorsement of religion
under the endorsement test.
The management of Native American sacred sites as
"traditional cultural property" also integrates the full range of
concerns that Native American practitioners have regarding the
spiritual and cultural value of the sites and gives Native Americans
a voice in their management. 48 The Historic Preservation Plan
describes the Medicine Wheel in terms sensitive to Native
American beliefs,149 and protection of the Landmark focuses on
"maintaining the traditional cultural values that exist in this part of
the Forest. Multiple uses will be managed in a way that will not
detract from the spiritual and traditional values associated with
these properties."' 5 0 The entire Mountain and areas within view of
the Mountain will be managed in accordance with Native
American beliefs, 151 with the sole goal of permitting visitors to
147. See HPP, supra note 141, at 10-11.
148. See discussion of Native American belief that religion and culture are
intertwined supra p. 22; Suagee, supra note 146, at 190-94.
149. See HPP, supra note 141, at 10.
[W]ithin the belief systems of Native American
traditional communities, the entirety of Medicine
Mountain is a traditional cultural property where
various interrelated ceremonial, religious, and other
traditional cultural activities occur . .. . Ceremonial
activities are ongoing today . . . . Other places in the
Medicine Mountain vicinity are of critical importance
within the functioning of Native American belief
systems, but they exhibit no material evidence of their
use because the nature of the activities conducted there
do not result in the accumulation of physical remains.
Nevertheless, the lack of material evidence at these
locations make them no less important to the traditional
cultural values of the Mountain and its continued
traditional use.
Id.
150. HPP, supra note 141, at 23.
151. See HPP, supra note 141, at 10, 15, 24, 26, 31, 41-42. For example:
The National Forest Service will consult with traditional Native Americans
designated by the Medicine Wheel Coalition. Id. at 15-16. The area
immediately surrounding the Wheel will be managed exclusively for the
protection of traditional cultural values, and the entire landscape will be treated
2003]
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"experience [its] powerful sanctity and learn about the nature of
Indian religions and the central importance that religion has in
traditional practitioners' lives." 
1 52
Predictably, the 1996 management plan aroused opposition,
especially from the local logging industry.153 Wyoming Sawmills
Incorporated filed suit, demanding that the court strike the plan,
because it believed the plan violated the Establishment Clause.
154
The court held that Sawmills showed an injury in fact only with
respect to its Complaint injuries, 55 but that these injuries were not
caused by the 1996 Historic Preservation Plan nor were these
injuries redressable by the court. 156 Therefore, the district court
granted the National Forest Service's motion to dismiss these
claims. 157 Because the district court resolved the case on issues of
standing, Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service
does not address the merits of Wyoming Sawmills' Establishment
Clause claim.'5 8  The issue of whether the Historic Preservation
Plan violates the Establishment Clause is still very much alive.
However, the circumstances of Wyoming Sawmill differ
from the prior three cases dealing with the accommodation of
Native American religions on federal lands. At Medicine Wheel,
the focus of National Forest Service accommodation of Native
American religions is the secular purpose of preserving a
traditional cultural resource and traditional cultural use of the
as a sacred place. Id. at 23-24, 29. The view from the Mountain and its entire
ecosystem will be maintained in as natural a state as possible, because the view
and the ecosystem are intrinsic to its value as a sacred place. Id. at 26. Certain
sacred sites on the Mountain will not be disclosed to the public at the request of
Native practitioners. Id. at 10. Visitor access to the site will be limited to
increase the privacy of Native American practitioners and prevent further
environmental degradation of the site. Id. at 29-39.
152. HPP, supra note 141, at 11.
153. See Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1286-88 (D. Wyo. 2001).
154. See id. at 1292-93.
155. See id. at 1293-96.
156. See id. at 1296-97.
157. See id. at 1296-97, 1306.
158. See Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1294-97 (D. Wyo. 2001).
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Wheel. 59 The language of the Plan emphasizes the value that
Medicine Wheel has to both Native American culture and
religion.' 60 The management of the Landmark as both a sacred site
and an educational resource for visitors underscores its cultural
value 161 and differs from the emphasis on recreational use at
Rainbow Bridge and Devil's Tower. The important secular
purpose of cultural preservation and the educational benefits of the
plan, which result from a consulting partnership with Native
American tribes, 162 improve the likelihood that the Plan will
withstand any future Establishment Clause challenges under the
endorsement test. Therefore, under the endorsement test, NHPA
recognition of a Native American sacred site as a "traditional
cultural property" can be used by the National Park Service and
Forest Service to support the constitutionality of accommodations
at the site.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts addressing Establishment Clause questions
that concern minority or disfavored religions should adopt the
endorsement test, because it promotes a thorough and informed
analysis of Establishment Clause questions. The endorsement test
also gives the National Park Service and the National Forest
Service latitude to create management plans that accommodate
Native American religions and can survive constitutional scrutiny.
The ultimate result of constitutional accommodations of Native
American religions on federal lands will not be coerced belief in
these religions, but understanding and tolerance of them. In the
words of Park Superintendent Deborah Liggett who oversaw the
creation of the General Management Plan at issue in Bear Lodge,
"I argue that a gesture of respect costs us little and benefits us as a
people - first people, most recent people and Americans yet to
come. I argue for reasonable accommodation. I argue for mutual
159. See HPP, supra note 141, at 5, 29-30.
160. See discussion of Native American belief that religion and culture are
intertwined supra pp. 140-141.
161. See HPP supra note 141, at 41-42.
162. See HPP, supra note 141, at Attachment C.
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respect."'' 63 The courts should permit the government to fulfill the
guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause and sanction constitutional
accommodations of religion.
o
163. Deborah Liggett, Mutual Respect Costs Us Little and Gains Us
Much, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 26, 1997, available at http://www.hcn.org.
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